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## KOSSUTH: A SKETCH OF A REVOLUTIONIST. II.

### VII. *Kossuth's Escape.*

THE sympathy manifested by the people of England with the Hungarian cause, especially after the Russian intervention, confirmed Lord Palmerston in his solicitude in regard to what was taking place in the East. On the first of August, 1849, he instructed Lord Ponsonby to inquire whether any arrangements were contemplated, in the event of the termination of the war, which would be at variance with the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna touching the balance of power in Europe, and also to make known to the Austrian government that he was authorized to exercise his good offices between that government and Hungary, if the intervention of a third power might in any respect be acceptable. Lord Ponsonby was further directed to call attention to certain proclamations that had been issued at Pest by the Austrian General Haynau, in which it was declared that the penalty of summary execution would be visited on every one who should by word or deed aid, support or participate in the cause of the rebels, or insult the Austrian or Russian soldiers. These instructions were brought to the notice of Prince Schwartzenberg on the day after Görgei's surrender. The manner in which they were received may, without entering into details, be inferred from Lord Ponsonby's statement that when he spoke of General Haynau's proclamation, the prince, "in very civil terms," told him "that the Austrians were the best judges of their own affairs."

It was not characteristic of Lord Palmerston, however, to abandon a line of policy merely because it proved to be ungrateful to those whom it affected. Nor did his interest in the Hungarian question abate with the downfall of the revolution. The conquered country was divided into military districts, and General Haynau pursued a policy of great severity. A large number of Hungarian officers were executed, though a general

amnesty was proclaimed as to the army from sergeants downwards. Count Louis Batthyányi was sentenced to be hanged; after attempting to commit suicide, however, he was shot. Palmerston, moved by Haynau's proceedings, instructed Lord Ponsonby to urge upon the Austrian government — and he caused a similar representation to be made to Russia — a concession to the national feelings of the Hungarians. Again his advice was repulsed. The world, Prince Schwartzberg declared, was agitated by a spirit of subversion. England had not been free from it, as was shown by the case of Canada, of the island of Cephallonia, and, last of all, of “unhappy Ireland.” But whenever revolt sprang up anywhere within the vast limits of the British Empire, the English government always maintained its authority “even at the cost of torrents of blood.” It did not lie with Austria, said the prince, to censure. Whatever the opinion she might have formed of insurrectionary movements in the British Empire, as well as of the means employed by the British government to strangle them, she thought it her duty to abstain from making that opinion known. By such conduct she thought she had acquired the right to expect of Lord Palmerston in that regard entire reciprocity.<sup>1</sup>

But a more serious question now arose. A large number of Hungarian and Polish refugees, including Kossuth, Dembinski, Bem, Perczel and other leaders in the revolution, escaped into Wallachia and stopped at Orsova, where they were hospitably received by the Turkish authorities. They were subsequently escorted to the fortress of Widdin, to await the Porte's decision as to their ultimate disposition. In the latter part of August the Austrian and Russian ambassadors at Constantinople peremptorily demanded of the Porte the extradition of these refugees, Austria claiming the Hungarians and Russia the Poles. By the treaty between Austria and Turkey

<sup>1</sup> It may be mentioned as a coincidence, that language almost precisely similar to that of Prince Schwartzberg had been used by the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish minister of state, in his then recent dismissal of Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister at Madrid, for offering, under Palmerston's instructions, some advice as to the manner in which the government of Her Catholic Majesty should be conducted.

concluded at Belgrade, September 10, 1739, it was provided that neither of the contracting parties should give asylum or shelter to rebels or malcontents, but that each of them should, on the other hand, punish all such persons, as well as all robbers and brigands, whom it might find within its dominions, of whichever party they might be the subjects. By the treaty between Russia and Turkey concluded at Kainardji, July 21, 1774, it was provided that if subjects of either party, having committed a capital crime or rendered themselves guilty of disloyalty or treason, should seek asylum in the territory of the other, they should be neither received nor protected, but should immediately be delivered up or else driven from the country. Such were the stipulations of the treaties. Neither treaty explicitly required the surrender of the fugitives: the treaty with Russia presented the alternative of extradition or expulsion.<sup>1</sup> The ambassadors, however, energetically pressed the demands of their governments, and finally, having urged upon the Porte, but without success, immediate compliance, they broke off diplomatic relations. Bem and fifteen of his Polish companions, appreciating the gravity of the situation, sought to assure themselves of the Porte's protection by embracing the Mohammedan religion.

It is not probable that Austria and Russia at any time contemplated extreme measures to enforce compliance with their demands. Indeed, early in October Prince Schwartzberg assured Lord Ponsonby that the rupture of diplomatic relations would not be attended on the part of Austria with a worse consequence than the expression of dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, if the Porte, which was without such an assurance, had been left to face the situation alone, the course of our narrative might have been different. But support was not wanting. From the moment the demands for extradition were made, Stratford Canning, seconded by General Aupick, the French minister at Constantinople, labored to place the Porte in an

<sup>1</sup> One of the charges made against Kossuth was the "larceny" of the crown jewels and other royal insignia of Hungary, which disappeared from Arad at the time of his flight and were found at Orsova.

attitude of firm resistance; and on the first of October it requested through its ambassador at London the moral, and if necessary the material, support of Great Britain. On the 6th, two days before Lord Ponsonby's report of his interview with Prince Schwartzberg was received, Palmerston informed Canning that Her Majesty's government, having been appealed to by the Porte, could not hesitate to comply with its request. On the same day he instructed Lord Ponsonby, at Vienna, and Lord Bloomfield, at St. Petersburg, to say to the Austrian and Russian governments that, as Turkey was not obliged by treaty to surrender the refugees, she was not called upon to deliver them up. In a passage that has often been quoted Palmerston said:

If there is one rule which more than another has been observed in modern times by all independent states, it is the rule not to deliver up political refugees, unless the state is bound to do so by the positive obligations of a treaty. . . . The laws of hospitality, the dictates of humanity, the general feelings of mankind, forbid such surrenders; and any independent government which of its own free will were to make such a surrender would be deservedly and universally stigmatized as degraded and dishonored.

His lordship admitted, however, that the Sultan was bound to prevent the refugees from hovering on either the Hungarian or the Transylvanian frontier, and ought to require them either to leave Turkish territory or to take up their residence somewhere in the interior.

At the same time Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces at Malta, was ordered with his squadron to the neighborhood of the Dardanelles, in order that he might be able to proceed to Constantinople, if he should be invited to do so by the Sultan through Her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople. The French government, acting in concert, ordered its naval forces in the Mediterranean to put to sea and, bearing up toward Malta, to enter into communication with the British admiral.

But the warlike aspect of affairs was soon modified. The peaceful assurance given by Prince Schwartzberg to Lord

Ponsonby was soon followed by a similar expression on the part of Russia, and a communication was made by the Russian government to the Porte, in which only the expulsion of the refugees was insisted on. The greater part of the Hungarian refugees at Widdin accepted from the Austrian government an offer of amnesty. The more distinguished of their number were not, however, included in the offer, and these, together with the Poles, were removed to Shumla. Subsequently fifty-four of the refugees, among whom was Kossuth, were transferred to Kutaiah, where the Porte engaged to detain them till there should no longer be anything to apprehend from their liberation.

The government of the United States now reappears upon the scene. When Mr. Stiles, the American *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna, reported his attempt in December, 1848, to use his good offices between Austria and Hungary, Mr. Buchanan, who was then secretary of state, expressed a guarded approval. While, he said, the foreign policy of the United States "must ever be governed by the wise maxim not to interfere with the domestic concerns of foreign nations," Mr. Stiles, in endeavoring merely "to open the door of reconciliation between the opposing parties, leaving them to adjust their differences without his intervention," did not appear to have departed from that policy; and if he had acted otherwise, he might have been "charged with a want of humanity." In the course of a few months the language and conduct of the government underwent so considerable a change that it would not have been discreditable to eminent statesmen to suppose that they considered the maxim expressed by Mr. Buchanan to be of doubtful wisdom. Such a supposition, however, would not have been well founded in all, or even in many, cases. If it is an evidence of political skill to find out what the people want and then to go before them in doing it, it must be conceded to be high art to conceal any sense of reluctance under the guise of a bold and enthusiastic leadership. But the clamor of popular excitement is not always to be accepted as the voice of the people. The interest felt in the United States in the Hungarian revo-

lution doubtless was widespread and sincere. It was greatly intensified when news came of the declaration of Hungarian independence; for, although this declaration left the question of a permanent form of government wholly in abeyance, it was immediately interpreted in the United States as the forerunner of a republic. It was only natural, therefore, that the American people, conscious of their own origin and condition, should be outspoken and demonstrative in their expressions of sympathy with the Hungarian movement. That a considerable proportion of them expected or desired any departure by the government from its established policy of non-intervention, by no means follows. The popular agitation was, however, of so marked and unusual a character as to invest even the wildest suggestion with an apparent political importance.

Early in June, 1849, a Hungarian in the city of New York, who had lived in America for two years, wrote a letter to President Taylor and enclosed with it a printed report of the proceedings at a meeting of "a small number of Hungarians" in that city, at which the writer of the letter had suggested that a petition be addressed to the president, requesting him to consider the propriety of sending a diplomatic representative to the Hungarian government. The writer stated that his countrymen, being perhaps "less experienced" than himself, had not been sufficiently impressed with the urgency of the petition, and he had concluded to present it himself, in the flattering hope that it would be successful. It seems that before the reception of this letter the proceedings in question "had not escaped attention" at Washington.

On the 18th of June Mr. A. Dudley Mann was appointed by the president "special and confidential agent of the United States to Hungary," and was invested with full power to conclude treaties concerning all matters of interest "to both nations." But, as the independence of Hungary had been neither established nor recognized, Mr. Mann was instructed first to proceed to Vienna, and to confer with Mr. Stiles upon the subject of his mission and upon "the best method of accomplishing its objects secretly and with despatch." The principal

object, Mr. Mann was told, that the president had in view, was "to obtain minute and reliable information in regard to Hungary, in connection with the affairs of adjoining countries," the "probable issue" of the "revolutionary movements," and the chances of "forming commercial arrangements" with Hungary "favorable to the United States." The struggle between Austria and Hungary, and the interference of Russia in the conflict, had, it was said, awakened "the most painful solicitude in the minds of Americans." Without departing from its "established policy of non-interference in the domestic concerns of other nations," the United States desired, if it should appear that Hungary was "able to maintain the independence she had declared," to be "the very first to congratulate her, and to hail with a hearty welcome her entrance into the family of nations." For the present, it was feared that the prospect of such an event was gloomy; and Mr. Mann was instructed that circumstances might be such as to make it safer for him not to proceed to Hungary at all. Of this, he was to be the judge. The "best wishes" of the United States attended Hungary. A policy of "immobility, backed by the bayonet," had opposed the efforts of the "illustrious man," Kossuth, to effect reforms and ameliorate the condition of his countrymen. To the contemplation of American statesmen, Hungary offered "the interesting spectacle of a great people rising superior to the enormous oppression" that had "so long weighed her down." The president, as had been said, desired "to obtain information in regard to Hungary, and her resources and prospects, with a view to an early recognition of her independence, and the formation of commercial relations with her." The president, inspired with "great confidence" in Mr. Mann's opinions, felt "no reluctance in leaving these delicate and important duties almost wholly to his discretion and prudence." He should decide on his own movements, on the proper mode of approaching Kossuth and his confidential advisers, and on the communications which he might deem it proper to make to them on the part of his government. These instructions were signed by Mr. Clayton, as



secretary of state. Such powers as they conferred on Mr. Mann had never before and have not since been confided to any representative of the United States ; and in later years, when civil war was raging in the United States and the national government was protesting against the concession by foreign powers of belligerent rights to the Confederate States, the Austrian government did not fail to recall the mission of Mr. Mann to Hungary.

When Mr. Mann arrived in Vienna, the Hungarian revolution was practically at an end, and he did not tarry in the Austrian capital. Subsequently, however, the fact of his mission as well as the character of his instructions became known, and the Chevalier Hülsemann, the imperial *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, was directed to make a confidential protest against the proceeding. Mr. Hülsemann's representations were met with the explanation that the only object of Mr. Mann's mission was to obtain information by personal observation. With this explanation, though it seemed to give a narrow interpretation to the mission, the Austrian government rested till Mr. Mann's instructions were communicated to Congress. Mr. Hülsemann was then directed, in view of the publication of the document, to enter a formal protest.

When this protest was presented President Taylor was dead, and Mr. Webster had succeeded Mr. Clayton as secretary of state. Mr. Webster's reply is generally known simply as the "Hülsemann Letter."<sup>1</sup> This fact sufficiently attests its popular reception as an overwhelming answer to Mr. Hülsemann's protest. It must, however, be admitted that the conditions were very favorable to such a reception, and it may be fortunate for the reputation of the note that the general impressions concerning it rest on tradition rather than on an accurate knowledge of its contents. Its style is somewhat turgid and labori-

<sup>1</sup> The first draft of this note was made by William Hunter, for many years an honored official in the Department of State. Subsequently, another draft was made at Mr. Webster's request by Edward Everett ; and finally Mr. Webster, with Mr. Hunter's and Mr. Everett's drafts before him, cast the note into the form in which it became historical. Curtis, *Life of Webster*, II, pp. 535-537.

ous, and it is pervaded by a truculence of expression not in harmony with the usual dignity of Mr. Webster's manner.

Mr. Webster began by observing that, as the publication of Mr. Mann's instructions consisted in a communication of them by the president to the Senate, it was a domestic matter of which foreign powers had no right to take cognizance. On this ground, he said, the president might, perhaps, have declined to make any particular reply to Mr. Hülsemann's protest ; but out of proper respect to the Austrian government it had been thought better to answer it at length. Mr. Webster contended that the confidential explanation previously given by Mr. Clayton of the object of Mr. Mann's mission ought to have been deemed "not only admissible, but quite satisfactory," since "nothing whatever" was alleged "to have been done or said" by Mr. Mann "inconsistent with such an object." The government and people of the United States, like other intelligent governments and communities, took a lively interest in the movements and events of the age. This interest, he declared, did not proceed from any desire to depart from a position of neutrality, but from the warm sympathy of the people with movements that appeared to have their origin in those great ideas of responsible and popular government on which the American constitutions were wholly founded. The people of the United States "could not, if they would, conceal their character, their condition or their destiny." The power of the republic was already "spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg" were "but as a patch on the earth's surface." The United States might, therefore, be pardoned, even by those who professed adherence to the principles of absolute governments, if they entertained an ardent affection for the popular forms of political organization which had so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness. Mr. Webster further argued that if the United States had gone so far as to acknowledge the independence of Hungary, that step, although, as the result had proved, it would have been precipitate, would not have been an

act against the law of nations, provided the United States took no part in the contest.

When this correspondence was laid before the Senate of the United States, a motion was made to print ten thousand extra copies of it. This motion was opposed by Mr. Clay, and was defeated by a vote of 21 to 18. Mr. Clay said that if a state of the United States had been in revolt, and a European government had sent an agent on such a mission as that of Mr. Mann, it would have created a great deal of feeling. He therefore doubted the soundness of Mr. Webster's contention, that it was a purely domestic transaction. It was published to the world. Its domestic character did not limit its publicity.

Meanwhile, another matter was disposed of in the Senate. In the preceding session Mr. Cass, not intending to allow the Whigs to monopolize public favor, introduced a resolution instructing the committee on foreign relations to inquire into the expediency of suspending diplomatic relations with Austria. Such a step would not, he said, in itself be a cause of offense. But he did not, he declared, "seek to deny or conceal the fact that the motives for the adoption of the measure would be unacceptable and peculiarly obnoxious to the feelings" of Austria. If he were to conceal those motives, he should not, he admitted, "look for that cordial approbation" which he "anticipated from the American people for this first effort to rebuke, by public opinion expressed through an established government, in the name of a great republic, atrocious acts of despotism" committed "under circumstances of audacious contempt for the rights of mankind and the sentiments of the civilized world." In this denunciation Mr. Cass said that he particularly referred to the act of Austria in invoking Russian aid. Seizing upon this statement, Senator Hale of New Hampshire, much to the disgust of Mr. Cass, moved to broaden the scope of the committee's inquiry. He said that he did not want the sympathies of the Senate to be "fenced in." He therefore proposed an amendment to include Russia. He also thought that "the docket ought to be called," and France placed at the bar to answer for her course in Italy, Spain and Algiers.

Spain and Turkey had likewise been guilty of objectionable acts; and there had lately been certain transactions between the United States and Mexico into which the committee might properly inquire. Mr. Clay ridiculed the resolution, and intimated that Mr. Cass's reference to the anticipated approbation of the American people was not without significance. At the close of the debate no action on the resolution was taken; and when it was called up by Mr. Cass at the next session of the Senate, in December, 1850, Mr. Badger, of North Carolina, inquired whether the statute of limitations would not apply to it. Mr. Cass replied: "Well, sir, I defer to the statute." The resolution was permitted to sleep.

On the 3d of March, 1851, however, the president approved a joint resolution of Congress "for the relief of Louis Kossuth and his associates, exiles from Hungary." This resolution requested the president, "if it [should] be the wish of these exiles to emigrate to the United States, and the will of the Sultan to permit them to leave his dominions," to authorize the employment of one of the public vessels of the United States cruising in the Mediterranean to convey them to America. Steps had already been taken by the president in that direction. As early as January, 1850, Mr. Clayton had instructed the minister of the United States at Constantinople to seek to obtain the liberation of Kossuth and his companions. Lord Palmerston instructed Canning to remind the Porte that the British government could act efficiently in support of the Ottoman Empire only so far as it might be backed by public opinion, and that the position of the Sultan as the jailer of a foreign power would destroy the feeling of sympathy which his prior conduct had aroused. The Sultan finally announced his determination to release all the refugees on the first of the ensuing September. This determination was hastened by the formal tender by the government of the United States a few days before, in conformity with the resolution of Congress, of a vessel to convey Kossuth and his companions to America.

There can be no doubt that the government of the United States contemplated the coming of Kossuth and his companions

to America in the character of emigrants. This fact appears not only by the resolution of Congress, but also by the instructions of the secretary of the navy, who directed Commodore Morgan, the commander of the squadron of the United States in the Mediterranean, to send the steamer *Mississippi* to Constantinople, as soon as he should be advised that the exiles desired "to seek a home" in the United States, and that the Sultan had consented to their departure. Kossuth, however, in his acceptance of the offer, did not refer to the matter of seeking a home, but merely expressed his impatience to be restored to liberty on board of a vessel and under "the glorious flag" of the United States. The general belief that he had ulterior designs led Commodore Morgan to order Captain Long, the commander of the *Mississippi*, so soon as he had received the exiles on board, to sail for New York, avoiding Naples and Leghorn and touching first at Spezzia, where the commodore had his headquarters. A similar caution was given to Captain Long by Mr. Marsh, the minister of the United States at Constantinople.

On the 10th of September Captain Long received on board of the *Mississippi* from a Turkish steamer, at the Dardanelles, Kossuth and his family, and a miscellaneous collection of fifty-five other persons, some of whom, as Captain Long afterward declared, had never been in Hungary; and, in order to prepare for the voyage to Spezzia, the *Mississippi* proceeded to Smyrna for supplies. When the presence of the vessel at that port became known, Kossuth was promptly visited by a committee of Italian refugees who had formed an association styled the Republican Society of the Orient, and this visit was followed by a commotion on shore of such a character as to induce Captain Long, in compliance with the request of the United States consul, to leave the port.

While this incident served to point the cautions he had already received, Captain Long soon learned from Kossuth himself something of the character of his plans. As the commander of a man-of-war on a peaceful mission, Captain Long deemed it to be his duty not to permit the presence of his ship to become the occasion or the means of hostile demonstrations

against the friendly governments at whose ports he might happen to call. This duty was imposed by his instructions, by the comity of nations, and by what he understood to be the policy of his government. Kossuth, on the other hand, proclaimed himself to be the leader of a great and impending revolution in Europe; and when he learned that the *Mississippi* would not touch at Genoa and certain other ports which he desired to visit, and that Captain Long wished to avoid a repetition of the incident at Smyrna, he declared that he was "still a prisoner," and that he would decide at Spezzia whether to continue his voyage to America.

On the morning of Sunday, the 21st of September, the *Mississippi* cast anchor in the bay of Spezzia. Kossuth at once dispatched a letter to Commodore Morgan, in which he said that he felt bound to answer the expectations which his own country, and "every other people suffering the same oppression and alike determined to shake it off," attached to his "once more free activity"; and that it would be an offense to the United States if he could entertain the slightest doubt that, once under "the protection of the stars and stripes," he was entirely free to take such course as best suited his aims. He therefore requested an immediate interview with the commodore, in order that he might decide upon the direction and the course of his "next activity." In this interview Kossuth announced his intention to visit England, where he had "highly important business" and "sacred duties" to arrange; and he asked that the *Mississippi*, if she could not carry him to Southampton, might convey him to Gibraltar and there await his return. As it was understood that the principal object of his proposed visit to England was to meet Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin and other revolutionary leaders, and in other ways to further his revolutionary enterprise, and as the season was growing late, Commodore Morgan at first insisted on a continuous voyage to the United States. Kossuth, however, followed up his interview with a rapid succession of letters, and finally proposed that the *Mississippi* should leave him at Marseilles, and then proceed to Gibraltar and there

await his return from England ; and he intimated that if this indulgence should be disapproved by the government of the United States, it would be sanctioned by "the people."

Commodore Morgan, while pointing out the possible obstacles to the proposed journey through France, yielded a desperate assent to Kossuth's last proposition. The commodore's anxiety to speed the parting guest was beginning to outweigh every other consideration ; for the incident at Smyrna was quite thrown into the shade by what took place at Spezzia. Boats filled with shouting patriots surrounded the *Mississippi*, and Kossuth added to the excitement by making the people an incendiary speech and promising them to come ashore. Hurried conferences were held between Mr. Kinney, the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States at Turin, and the Sardinian minister for foreign affairs, the result of which was that Kossuth was not permitted to land and that every exertion was made to hasten his departure. On the 23d of September, two days before the *Mississippi* sailed for Marseilles, Commodore Morgan addressed to Mr. Hodge, the consul of the United States at that port, the following letter :

MY DEAR CONSUL : — Such are the necessities and frailties of human events, that, after all, the *Mississippi* will be at Marseilles within a week with Kossuth. The devil seems to possess this gentleman. He contemplates leaving the ship at that point, with his wife and children, for England, and to join her again in twenty days thereafter at Gibraltar. His determined *wilfulness* is *unconquerable*, and the ship will speed to your city within a few days. He is *utterly ungovernable*, and I am compelled to hasten him out of this country. He is like a firebrand. The whole bay around was illuminated last night, bands of music surrounding the steamer, and he always ready for applause. The public authorities were alarmed to utter confusion, and they ran about the streets, having the appearance of somnambulists. Good morning. In great haste, *etc.*

On Friday, the 26th of September, the *Mississippi* arrived at Marseilles, where, to quote the words of Mr. Hodge, there were "eight or ten thousand Roman and other patriots, all very excitable." Mr. Hodge, however, obtained from the well-

disposed prefect of the city permission for all the refugees to go ashore, and a telegraphic request was sent to Paris to obtain leave for Kossuth to pass through France. It was not long before Kossuth's hotel was surrounded by throngs of people uttering what were described as "unsuitable cries," and on the following day, when, accompanied by the consul, he returned to the *Mississippi*, he was followed to his boat by "some thousands" of shouting and cheering admirers. Meanwhile, the French government refused to permit him to pass through France. This refusal the prefect made known by a letter to Mr. Hodge, which the latter sent to Kossuth. Kossuth immediately communicated this letter to a journal called *Le Peuple*, which Mr. Hodge characterized as a violent "*rouge* paper," together with an address of his own to the "citizens," praising them for their "manifestation of republican sentiments" — a manifestation "honorable for its motives, manly for its resolution, peaceable in its ardor, and as majestic in its calmness as nature, the grand image of God, before the tempest" — and declaring that the "honor of the French nation" was "not in the keeping" of Louis Napoleon, M. Faucher and others, to whom the executive power had been delegated. *Le Peuple* promptly published both the prefect's letter and the address, with copious animadversions, such as the following :

Indignation fills our hearts and shame reddens our brow. The French democracy must, then, drink the cup of bitterness to its dregs. . . . Léon Faucher has just cast his filthy slime on our French honor. . . . Shame and woe upon us ! French honor sweats through all its pores at this [the prefect's] miserable reply.

When Mr. Hodge was made aware of this proceeding by a remonstrance of the prefect, he addressed an urgent note to Captain Long, complaining that both his official character as consul and his flag had been compromised by it. At this complaint Kossuth took great umbrage. He declared that constitutional governments should not object to publicity, and that he would confidently await the judgment of public opinion in the United States as to the propriety of his conduct. He



also expressed surprise that when, uncovering his head, he bowed his thanks to the people who came in "a hundred boats floating around the *Mississippi*, singing national songs, offering garlands of laurels" to him, "garlands of immortelles to America, and shouting 'hurrah'" to the United States and to himself, Captain Long walked the deck "without even waving his cap"; and his surprise was, he declared, still heightened, when the captain accosted him in a reproachful manner, and intimated that he (Kossuth) was compromising him by remaining on deck. He would, he said, free the captain from embarrassment by leaving the ship wherever the latter pleased.

Relieved at not having been ordered by the authorities to leave the port, and in the midst of what Mr. Hodge called a "mob valedictory," Captain Long took his departure, expressing the hope that he might "never be caught in such a net again." At Gibraltar, Kossuth disembarked with his family and proceeded to Southampton, with the understanding that, owing to the lateness of the season, the *Mississippi* would continue her voyage to America, while he himself, after arranging his affairs in England, would sail for the United States in a regular packet.

### VIII. *A Revolutionary Emissary.*

On the 23d of October, 1851, Kossuth arrived at Southampton, where he was received by the mayor and corporation of the city with an enthusiastic welcome. Standing on English ground, he now displayed before an English-speaking people the marvelous versatility of his oratorical genius. It seems to have been his habit when in prison to devote himself to the acquisition of languages. In this way he is said to have mastered English during his early imprisonment in the fortress of Buda, sufficiently to read the plays of Shakespeare; and during his imprisonment in Turkey he again applied himself to linguistic studies. He could speak with fluency not only his native tongue, but Latin, Slovak, French, German, Italian and English, each of which, as occasion arose, he employed in his

addresses. Whatever may be our opinion as to his character — and it cannot be said to have been well-balanced — it must be admitted that there was something of uncommon interest in the spectacle of this exile, the representative of a defeated revolution, pleading his prostrate cause before the world, while the people, carried away by his eloquence, applauded even where they could not approve. His picturesque appearance, his misfortunes, the Oriental richness of his imagination, the quaintness and fervor of his speech, the thrilling vibrations of his voice — all combined to awaken the sympathy and enthusiasm of the people.

From Southampton Kossuth proceeded to Winchester; from Winchester he went to London; from London to Birmingham, and from Birmingham to Manchester. In all these places he spoke in his usually eloquent manner, and was received with popular demonstrations in which some men of eminence participated. He refused to meet Lord Palmerston, though an invitation to do so was conveyed to him through Lord Dudley Stuart, one of his most ardent friends and admirers. By the governing classes, Kossuth was regarded with a feeling of distrust — a feeling doubtless enhanced by the consciousness on their part that his mission, so far as it looked to material aid, was visionary. It was evident that he sought something more than sympathy. While he continually protested that all his solicitations were peaceful, he skillfully played on the anti-Russian sentiment which then specially prevailed in England, and it was impossible not to see that the policy he advocated rested in the last analysis on armed intervention.

On the 24th of November Kossuth embarked at Southampton on the American steamer *Humboldt* for the United States. He arrived at New York on the night of the 4th of December, after a stormy passage; and, in spite of the lateness of the hour, the health officer of the port boarded the steamer at quarantine and delivered the following address of welcome, which, though somewhat florid, was pitched in the requisite key:

ILLUSTRIOUS MAGYAR! NOBLE KOSSUTH!—We greet you from the Western World. Welcome to the land of freedom! Welcome to the Republic of America! which, though yet in its infancy, demonstrates that man is fitted for self-government — which rises like a lighthouse in the skies, as a memento to the lovers of freedom throughout the whole world. You come to us not a stranger. No! From the pine-forests of Maine to the sugar-bottoms of Texas; from the coal-fields of Pennsylvania to the golden mountains of California,—in all that vast region of country, washed on one side by the stormy Atlantic and on the other by the calm Pacific, the name of Kossuth will unlock every heart; and your coming will be the signal for the uprising of eighteen millions of people, to give you a generous, cordial, heart-felt and enthusiastic welcome.

Though suffering from the effects of his voyage, Kossuth was immediately called upon to address numerous delegations; and on the 6th of December a great public reception was given in his honor by the municipal authorities. Public men and private persons, the civil and the military, judges and lawyers, political societies, Sons of Liberty, European democrats, omnibus proprietors, volunteer fire companies and citizens generally, were invited to participate. Proprietors of hotels, the custodians of public buildings and the masters of vessels in port were requested to display their flags.

On this occasion Kossuth, in a public address, cast off all reserve, and in his “official capacity” as the representative of Hungary, made an appeal for aid. Europe was, he declared, on the eve of great events. The course of the government of the United States in regard to his liberation had produced a “conviction throughout the world” that the people had resolved to “throw their weight into the balance” in which “the fate of the European continent was to be weighed.” Humble as he was, God, the Almighty, had selected him to represent the cause of humanity before them. His aim was to restore his fatherland to the full enjoyment of its declaration of independence, which, having been lost through the violent invasion of Russian arms, was “fully entitled to be recognized by the people of the United States.” What could be opposed to

this recognition? "The frown of Mr. Hülsemann?" The "anger of that satellite of the Czar, called Francis Joseph, of Austria?" The "immense danger," which some European and American papers threatened, that the American minister at Vienna would be offered his passports, and that Mr. Hülsemann would leave Washington? As to the minister at Vienna, how could the people reconcile their permitting him to stay there with their opinion of the cause of Hungary? As to Mr. Hülsemann, it was not likely that he "would be so ready to leave Washington." He had "extremely well digested the caustic pills which Mr. Webster" had "administered to him so gloriously." Having thus expounded his aims, Kossuth declared that he had not come to the United States for a "happy rest," but to entreat of the people their "generous aid." He had been granted a reception "unparalleled in history," though, in so saying, he was aware that Lafayette was received in a similar manner. But Lafayette had claims to the country's gratitude. He had fought in the ranks for its freedom and independence. "He was," said Kossuth,

the link of your friendly connection with France — a connection, the results of which were two French fleets of more than thirty-eight men-of-war, and three thousand gallant men who fought side by side with you against Cornwallis before Yorktown; the precious gift of twenty-four thousand muskets; a loan of nineteen millions of dollars; and even the preliminary treaties of your glorious peace negotiated at Paris by your immortal Franklin. I hope the people of the United States . . . will kindly remember these facts; and you, citizens of New York, will yourselves become the Lafayettes of Hungary. . . . I am told that I will have the honor to review your patriotic militia. Oh, God! how my heart throbs at the idea, to see this gallant army enlisted on the side of freedom against despotism; the world would be free, and you the saviors of humanity.

In an address made a few days later to a party of visitors from a distant city, Kossuth entered into an elaborate argument to show that the consideration of distance should not deter the United States in the case of Hungary, any more than in the case of Cuba, from interfering against European invasion.

Cuba was six days distant from New York, Hungary was eighteen. Was this, he asked, a circumstance to regulate the conduct and the policy of a great people?

During his sojourn in the city of New York Kossuth continued daily to witness manifestations of widespread popular interest. Delegations from the New York bar, from the New England Society, from various political, religious and philanthropic associations, and from cities and towns, far and near, waited upon him. Between the 6th and the 22d of December he received upwards of thirty-five visiting bodies, besides attending numerous dinners and public receptions given in his honor; and the enthusiasm which he aroused by his addresses on these occasions bears ample testimony to the power of his oratory, as well as to the versatility of genius that enabled him in a strange land and in a strange tongue to adapt his discourse to such rapidly shifting conditions.

On the 24th of December Kossuth arrived in Philadelphia. The cold was intense. A deep snow covered the ground, and the Delaware river was frozen so hard that vehicles drawn by horses could cross it on the ice. Kossuth spoke from the balcony in the rear of Independence Hall to a dense crowd that filled the square. Just as he had done at New York, Kossuth took especial pains to assure the people that he did not propose to meddle with their "domestic questions." But it was not quite clear to all how this assurance, whose obvious purpose was to conciliate the favor of Southern statesmen, could be reconciled with his theory of intervention and the grounds on which he placed it. About the time of his arrival in Philadelphia there appeared in a local journal a fictitious letter, purporting to have been written by William B. Reed, the state's attorney, in which Kossuth was apprised that "the intervention or non-intervention sentiments" which he had promulgated in New York were "unsuitable to the region of Pennsylvania," situated as she was "on the borders of several slave-holding States"; that such sentiments were "incendiary in their character and effect," and that they "would be brought to the notice of the grand inquest of the county, for their con-

sideration and action." Though Mr. Reed immediately disavowed the authorship of this letter, Kossuth at a public dinner sought occasion to say:

I avail myself of this opportunity to declare once more that I never did or never will do anything which, in the remotest way, could interfere with the matter alluded to, nor with whatever other domestic question of your United Republic, or of a single state of it.

By such expressions, as well as by the anxious haste with which he disavowed and condemned certain anti-slavery sentiments uttered in New York by one of his companions in revolution and in exile, he incurred the denunciation of Garrison, Phillips and other leading Abolitionists. And was not the logic of the situation on the side of the Abolitionists? Liberty, as Kossuth professed it, could not mean one thing in Europe and another thing in America; and his efforts to magnify its importance in Hungary, whilst eagerly pronouncing its denial to a numerous race in the United States to be a "domestic question," led many to doubt the rigor of his principles and the elevation of his motives.

But Kossuth's immediate objective was the national capital, where he hoped to be received in what he called his "official capacity," and to bring the government into line with his policy. For this reason he had shunned "domestic questions." At Washington, however, a disposition was manifested to treat his visit purely as a domestic question. Of all those who shared this inclination, the most conspicuous was Mr. Webster. It is well known that at this time Mr. Webster ardently desired the Whig nomination for the presidency. The nomination of General Taylor by the Whigs in 1848 had been a bitter disappointment to him, and he had declared it to be a nomination "not fit to be made"; and, although no official position could have added to the luster of his just renown, he looked forward in his declining years with a last desperate hope to the Whig convention in 1852 for the coveted distinction. Only a fortnight before Kossuth's arrival in New York a numerous assembly of delegates in Massachusetts issued an ad-

dress to the people of the United States, in which Mr. Webster's claims to the presidency were formally set forth. As an aspirant for popular favor, who at the same time held the office of secretary of state, Mr. Webster well understood the delicacy of the situation in which the approach of Kossuth placed him. One of the chief stumbling blocks in the way to his final ambition had been the fact that, while he received the homage due to great abilities, he was unable to excite popular enthusiasm for himself; and, in the present critical conjuncture, he did not want to be charged with coldness.

Before the arrival of Kossuth at New York, Mr. Webster was advised, by the reports made to the Department of State of the incidents at Spezzia and Marseilles, that Kossuth was not coming to the United States as an emigrant, but as the representative of popular principles in some as yet undefined sense, and that he expected to appear as the guest of the nation and to invest his visit with public importance. Being thus informed, Mr. Webster, toward the close of November, sent for Senator Foote, who had offered the resolution under which the *Mississippi* was sent to Turkey, and informed him that the president would recommend to Congress in his annual message "to consider in what manner Governor Kossuth and his companions, brought hither by its authority," should "be received and treated." He then requested Mr. Foote to introduce a joint resolution to raise a committee to carry out this recommendation. Mr. Foote did not appear to be anxious to undertake the business, and suggested that, if Congress should raise a joint committee, Mr. Webster himself should deliver the address of welcome. This suggestion Mr. Webster promptly declined, on the ground of his unwillingness to do anything that might compromise the government's "neutral relations"; but he referred to the case of Lafayette, which, he said, might be treated as a precedent, and expressed the opinion that the best mode of receiving Kossuth would be to bring him, without any particular ceremony, to each house of Congress, and have him introduced by the presiding officer with suitable addresses on each side. Mr. Foote still declined to enter into

the project unless he should be authorized to say that he acted at the instance of the secretary of state, and this point Mr. Webster conceded.

When Congress assembled Mr. Foote immediately brought in a resolution for the appointment of a joint committee to receive Kossuth "on his arrival in the United States," and to tender to him "the hospitalities of the capital." Though Mr. Foote stated that he was acting "in unison with the administration, and somewhat at the instance of the secretary of state," strong opposition to the resolution was manifested on both sides of the Senate. Mr. Foote, in moving the adoption of the resolution, declared: "There has been but one Washington, and there is but one Kossuth—distinguished in war as in peace." When asked to name a single battle in which Kossuth was ever distinguished, he sharply told his interrogator that every one was "bound to know" such facts—a dexterous reply, if not altogether polite. At this point John P. Hale, the great Freesoiler, introduced confusion by announcing his intention to offer an amendment, expressive of the hope that the time might speedily come when the rights of man should be respected by all governments. Quick to suspect a hidden meaning, Mr. Foote said that he hoped that the subject before the Senate would "be discussed in language suited to the ears of statesmen," and declared that the amendment was "demagogical." He also insinuated that Mr. Hale was "seeking notoriety," to which the latter retorted that he was only trying in an humble way to play tail to the kite Mr. Foote had set flying. Mr. Cass now rose and protested against introducing into the discussion any "abstract declaration as to the rights of man"; it was simply throwing the "firebrand of slavery" into the hall. There was, he declared, no excuse for it. The agitation produced by Mr. Hale's announcement was so great that the Senate lost sight of the fact, till the presiding officer recalled it, that the amendment had not in reality been offered and was not before the house. As the result of the debate, however, Mr. Foote withdrew his resolution, and Mr. Seward gave notice of a substitute simply to declare that Congress, in the name of



the people, extended to Kossuth a cordial welcome to the capital and the country.

Before action could be taken on Mr. Seward's resolution, Kossuth arrived in New York and made his speech at Castle Garden. The grotesquely incongruous spectacle of the nation's guest, then on his way to the capital in his "official capacity," denouncing the heads of friendly governments, heaping ridicule on the minister of one of them, and inciting the people to take up arms against both of them, was not without its effect. Even Mr. Foote was led to admit that the "original expectations" with which he introduced the resolution to bring Kossuth and his associates to the United States "had not been founded upon actual facts"; and a member of the House of Representatives gave notice of a resolution to request the president to send Kossuth copies of certain laws, and to have him arrested, if, after reading them, he continued to make such speeches as that at Castle Garden. Protestations, however, were in vain. Popular excitement, instead of subsiding, was actually rising, and statesmen who had engaged for the voyage could see no reason for abandoning it so long as the wind and tide were with them. Mr. Seward's joint resolution passed the Senate and the House of Representatives by large majorities. A few days later a resolution was adopted by the Senate by a smaller majority, and against strong opposition, to appoint a committee to present Kossuth to that body. A similar resolution was adopted by the House by a vote of 154 to 54, but its opponents delayed its passage till nearly a week after Kossuth's arrival in Washington.

As the time of Kossuth's arrival in that city drew near, Mr. Webster's anxieties increased. On December 23 he wrote privately to a friend: "It requires great caution so to conduct things here, when Mr. Kossuth shall arrive, as to keep clear both of Scylla and Charybdis." Two days later he wrote to another friend: "Kossuth is in Philadelphia; his presence here will be quite embarrassing. I am a good deal at a loss what to do and what to say. I hope I may be able to steer clear of trouble on both sides." On December 30, the day of

Kossuth's arrival in Washington, Mr. Webster had a case to argue in the supreme court. Writing to President Fillmore early in the day, he said: "He [Kossuth] will be, it is said, immediately surrounded by the Jackson Association, and it is doubtful whether I can see him till after court." In the afternoon, Mr. Webster wrote in a private letter as follows:

I have called on Kossuth. No exception, certainly, can be taken to his appearance and demeanor as a gentleman ; he is handsome enough in person, evidently intellectual and dignified, amiable and graceful in his manners. I shall treat him with all personal and individual respect, but, if he should speak to me of the policy of intervention, I shall "have ears more deaf than adders." I go with him to the President's tomorrow. The President invites him to dine on Saturday.

On December 31, Mr. Webster wrote to the same friend:

I have now come from the President, where with Governor Seward I have been presenting Kossuth. The President received him with great propriety, and his address was all right. Sympathy, personal respect and kindness, but no departure from our established policy.

Kossuth was both disappointed and chagrined by President Fillmore's address, but it was not the fault of the president. Mr. Fillmore was under the impression that an explicit understanding had been reached with Kossuth, through his secretary, that no allusion would be made in his speech to the subject of intervention ; and the president had prepared his reply accordingly. To his surprise, Kossuth made a direct appeal for aid. The president was thus compelled to frame an address on the spur of the moment ; and with courtesy and dignity, but with perfect candor, he declared that no sanction, much less material assistance, could be given by the United States to the cause Kossuth advocated. This incident rendered Kossuth's intercourse with the White House somewhat embarrassing. Of the dinner subsequently given in his honor by the president, a person who was present has written the following account :

During and after dinner the bearing of the guest, in behalf of whom the banquet had been given, was stately and constrained. It was evident that he felt sore and angry. He stood apart after dinner, in a manner which repelled attempts to enter into conversation with him. His whole appearance, alike by his picturesque costume and his attitude and expression, suggested a moody Hamlet, whom neither man nor woman pleased. After a vain attempt to engage him in conversation on Hungarian topics, I asked Mr. Fillmore what had happened to his illustrious guest to have thrown him into such an evidently ungenial state of feeling. He said it was in consequence of what had occurred at his presentation.

For his disappointment at the White House, Kossuth found compensation in his reception by Congress — a compensation, however, that was wholly illusory. On January 5, 1852, he was received by the Senate, and on the 7th by the House of Representatives. In the Senate the proceedings were purely formal, and there were no addresses; in the House the same formality was observed, but Kossuth, after his presentation, briefly expressed his thanks for the cordiality of his reception. On the evening of the 7th of January, he attended a Congressional banquet, at which William R. King, then President of the Senate, assisted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, presided. Both these gentlemen were averse to the Congressional demonstrations, and participated in them with reluctance. But among the principal speakers at the dinner was Mr. Webster; and it is proper that the explanation he made to President Fillmore of the motives of his attendance, when, only a few hours before the banquet, he decided to be present, should be given as he wrote it:

I have come to the conclusion that it is well for some of us to go to the dinner this evening. The President of the Senate is to preside, and the Speaker of the House is to act as vice-president. It has been said that assurances have been given that nothing shall be said that shall justly be offensive to these gentlemen as anti-intervention men. But what chiefly influences me is, that I learned yesterday that preparations were making for a good deal of an attack upon us, if no member of the administration should pay Kossuth the

respect of attending the dinner given to him by members of Congress, of all parties, as the nation's guest. I wish the Heads of Departments could see their way clear to go, as I think I shall go myself. In the present state of the country, especially in the interior, where Kossuth is going, I should not like unnecessarily to provoke popular attack.

Kossuth's reception at the banquet was most enthusiastic. It was, indeed, a Kossuth night. All present were "completely entranced by his singularly captivating eloquence." One who was present writes :

I was assigned a seat next Mr. Seward, and his demonstrations of applause by hands and feet and voice were excessive. The "Hungarian Whirlwind" certainly carried away everything on that occasion, and mingled all parties into one confused mass of admirers prostrate at Kossuth's feet. His speech seemed to me wanting in no element of a consummate masterpiece of eloquence.

On the other hand, Mr. Webster's manner on this occasion has been described as "constrained"; and it is said that "after the high pitch of enthusiasm to which the audience had been wrought up," his speech "fell rather heavily upon them, and did not give that measure of encomium of M. Kossuth which their feelings at the moment craved." The same authority, a personal friend of Mr. Webster, tells us that "his recent experience in connection with M. Kossuth, while it had not diminished his admiration of his brilliant ability, had "convinced him that, though matchless as an orator, he was no statesman." For the most part, Mr. Webster's speech was colorless, but he closed it with the declaration that the first prayer for Hungary should be that she might become "independent of all foreign powers." He did not profess to understand "the social relations and connections of races and of twenty other things" that might affect "the public institutions of Hungary." All he could say was that she could regulate these matters for herself "infinitely better" than they could "be regulated for her by Austria ; and, therefore," said Mr. Webster, "I limit my

aspirations for Hungary, for the present, to that single and simple point — Hungarian independence, Hungarian self-government, Hungarian control of Hungarian destinies.”

On the evening on which Mr. Webster made this speech, there was another statesman in Washington, whose name will ever be associated with his in the great triumvirate — Henry Clay, who refused to countenance an agitation which he knew to be harmless only so far as it was hopeless. Kossuth more than once expressed a desire to meet him, and Mr. Clay, though in feeble health, at length granted him an interview. It is said that on a certain occasion, after receiving a party of American statesmen, of whom Mr. Clay was one, Lord Castle-reagh, while speaking appreciatively of all his visitors, said he “liked that man from Kentucky best.” The charm and cordiality of Mr. Clay’s manner never forsook him, and he received Kossuth with the utmost kindness. But his candor was equal to his kindness; and it may be said that there was kindness in his candor. “For the sake of my country,” said Mr. Clay, addressing Kossuth,

you must allow me to protest against the policy you propose to her. Waiving the grave and momentous question of the right of one nation to assume the executive power among nations, for the enforcement of international law, or of the right of the United States to dictate to Russia the character of her relations with the nations around her, let us come at once to the practical consideration of the matter. You tell us yourself, with great truth and propriety, that mere sympathy, or the expression of sympathy, cannot advance your purposes. You require material aid. . . . Well, sir, suppose that war should be the issue of the course you propose to us, could we then effect anything for you, ourselves, or the cause of liberty? To transport men and arms across the ocean in sufficient numbers and quantities to be effective against Russia and Austria, would be impossible. . . . Thus, sir, after effecting nothing in such a war, after abandoning our ancient policy of amity and non-intervention in the affairs of other nations, and thus justifying them in abandoning the terms of forbearance and non-interference which they have hitherto preserved toward us; after the downfall, perhaps, of the friends of liberal institutions in Europe: her despots, imitating and provoked by our

fatal example, may turn upon us in the hour of weakness and exhaustion, and with an almost equally irresistible force of reason and of arms, they may say to us : “ You have set us the example ; you have quit your own to stand on foreign ground ; you have abandoned the policy you professed in the day of your weakness, to interfere in the affairs of the people upon this continent, in behalf of those principles, the supremacy of which you say is necessary to your prosperity, to your existence. We, in our turn, believing that your anarchical doctrines are destructive of, and that monarchical principles are essential to, the peace, security and happiness of our subjects, will obliterate the bed which has nourished such noxious weeds ; we will crush you, as the propagandists of doctrines so destructive of the peace and good order of the world.” The indomitable spirit of our people might and would be equal to the emergency, and we might remain unsubdued, even by so tremendous a combination, but the consequences to us would be terrible enough. You must allow me, sir, to speak thus freely, as I feel deeply, though my opinion may be of but little import, as the expression of a dying man. . . . By the policy to which we have adhered since the days of Washington, we have prospered beyond precedent ; we have done more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect ; we have shown to other nations the way to greatness and happiness. . . . Far better is it for ourselves, for Hungary and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to our wise pacific system and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our lamp burning brightly on this western shore, as a light to all nations, than to hazard its utter extinction, amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe.

When Kossuth left Washington on the 12th of January, he addressed to President Fillmore a farewell letter, with a request that it might be communicated to Congress. To this request the president, through Mr. Webster, declined to accede, at the same time suggesting that the letter might be sent to the presiding officers of the two houses. On this suggestion Kossuth subsequently acted, but his letter, which dwelt overmuch on the honors shown him, and expressed the hope that the United States would pronounce in favor of the law of nations and of international rights and duties, was coldly received. A motion to print it was carried in the Senate by only one vote, and the arguments in support of the motion

were almost exclusively confined to considerations of courtesy. One Senator roundly denounced the "Kossuth humbug," and declared that it could not again be "galvanized into life." Another spoke of the reception by the Senate as a "dumb show." Another yet, paraphrasing the words of Falstaff, said that Kossuth not only had much "talk" in himself, but was the cause of talk in other men. Indeed, the sudden collapse of Kossuth enthusiasm in high places, after his departure from the capital, would have been inexplicable, if the open opponents of his policy of intervention had found any one to meet them on that ground.

There is only one incident of Kossuth's visit to the national capital that remains to be narrated. However well the Chevalier Hülsemann may have "digested the caustic pills which Mr. Webster administered to him so gloriously," it was his somewhat ironical misfortune to figure from first to last as the principal victim of the Hungarian excitement. Some time after his diplomatic physicking he made a trip to Havana, and on his passage through New Orleans he was subjected to what he described as "demonstrations of an exceedingly disagreeable character." Of this circumstance, as well as of the fact that his interviews with the Department of State were derisively commented upon and burlesqued in certain newspapers, he sought occasion, after his return to Washington, to complain to Mr. Webster. Mr. Webster, deeming the language of his complaint to be offensive, informed him that thenceforth his intercourse with the department must be exclusively in writing. After Kossuth's reception in New York Mr. Hülsemann accordingly addressed to Mr. Webster a note, in which he complained of the military honors paid to Kossuth by the federal authorities. To this note Mr. Webster did not reply; and Mr. Hülsemann's perplexities were afterwards increased by Mr. Webster's speech at the Kossuth banquet. Finding himself apparently excommunicated by the Department of State, Mr. Hülsemann now resolved to try a direct appeal to the president; and, although he was only a *chargé d'affaires ad interim*, and not entitled to claim an audience of the head of

the government, the president not only received him but assured him of his desire to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Austria. But as this assurance was not followed by any official communication, and as no step was taken by Mr. Webster towards a reconciliation, Mr. Hülsemann in the latter part of April gave notice that his government could not allow him to remain in Washington any longer, "to continue an official intercourse with the principal promoters of the much-to-be-lamented Kossuth episode." At the same time he tendered his "respectful thanks to the president for his invariably obliging conduct" towards him, and stated that the consul-general of Austria in New York would "continue to perform his functions until further orders."

When this note was received at the Department of State Mr. Webster was absent, and by his direction it was formally answered by the acting-secretary. On his return, however, he addressed a communication on the subject to Mr. McCurdy, the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States at Vienna, and instructed him that he was at liberty to read it to the Austrian minister for foreign affairs. In this paper Mr. Webster said it was obvious from the tenor of Mr. Hülsemann's recent communication that, notwithstanding his long residence in the United States, he was quite uninformed as to the character of American institutions, and as to "the responsibilities of public men in the United States for their acts or their sentiments in a private capacity in regard to foreign powers." Mr. Hülsemann had yet to learn that no foreign government or its representative could "take just offense at anything which an officer" of the United States might "say in his private capacity." "Official communications only," said Mr. Webster, were "to be regarded as indicating the sentiments and views of the government of the United States"; and, if those communications were of a "friendly character," the foreign government had no right or reason to infer that there was any insincerity in them, or "to point to other matters as showing the real sentiments of the government."

Chief-Justice Marshall once said of a great argument that its



only defect was its "want of verisimilitude." Mr. Webster's letters have already shown us that their writer was not unconscious of the inconveniences of his position at the Kossuth banquet. But if the secretary of state could, without resigning his office, so completely resume his private capacity that a foreign government could not even infer anything from what he said about it in a public speech, it is not clear why Mr. Webster's course, instead of being beset, as he said, by a Scylla and a Charybdis, should not have been attended with "all that poets feign of bliss and joy." In the same way a dose of the "caustic pills" administered to Mr. Hülsemann might have been administered to his master, or to any other foreign sovereign, with equal impunity, and with even greater glory.

But the fatal defect in Mr. Webster's position was the fact that Kossuth did not come to Washington in a "private capacity," but as the "representative of Hungary"; and Mr. Webster, being apprised of this fact, sought an opportunity publicly to declare in his presence a wish that the revolution might yet be successful. If with this declaration he had coupled a public disclaimer of any purpose to endorse the policy of intervention which Kossuth proposed, his position would have been vastly stronger. Such a disclaimer, however, he did not make; and Mr. Hülsemann was hardly censurable, especially as his note remained unanswered, in assuming that what the secretary of state declared publicly, though in "a private capacity," might in the end be confirmed by his official communications, if it was not already reflected in his official acts.

In the following autumn Mr. Webster died at Marshfield. Perhaps it may be said that he had in one respect made Mr. Hülsemann his debtor. He had, indeed, treated him somewhat inconsiderately. He had manifested towards him an irritability, excited by perplexities, which it had been better to avoid. But he had in a manner associated Hülsemann, though ungraciously, with his own imperishable name. When Edward Everett, after the death of Mr. Webster, became secretary of state, he soon found an opportunity to convey to the

Austrian government a graceful intimation that it would be agreeable to the president if Mr. Hülsemann should return to his post. In due time Mr. Hülsemann resumed his official functions, and he thereafter continued in the discharge of them for a period of more than twelve years.

After his departure from Washington, Kossuth made an excursion through the West and South, and afterward through the North and East. He spoke at Harrisburgh, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Louisville, Memphis, Jackson, Mobile, St. Louis, Buffalo, Syracuse, Utica, Albany, New Haven, Springfield, Worcester, Lowell, Salem, Lexington, Concord, Plymouth, Faneuil Hall and Bunker Hill. He addressed the Senate of Maryland and the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, and he was banqueted by the legislature of Massachusetts. Subsequently he returned to New York, and, after remaining there for the most part quietly for two months, he sailed for England. From the gifts of admirers and the sale of "Hungarian bonds" he had realized the sum of about ninety thousand dollars. This was the only substantial aid that he derived from his visit. His departure was scarcely noticed. The popular excitement concerning him died out with a suddenness proportionate to its extravagance. His triumphal progress, however, left its traces in the popular fashions. For a time "Kossuth hats" were much in request. But far more enduring was the encouragement he gave to the wearing of beards. As Jonas Hanway opened the way to the use of umbrellas in England, so Kossuth by his own example taught the men of the United States that the wearing of beards was not unmanly.

In England Kossuth joined Mazzini and Ledru-Rollin and entered into their revolutionary conspiracies. In 1853, in consequence of a local uprising produced in Hungary, his mother and sisters were banished from the country, and several persons were executed. In 1854 he sent a vehement protest to the United States against the refusal of the Senate to confirm in office a person who, after proceeding to London as consul of the United States, became notoriously implicated in attempts

planned in that city to start a revolution on the continent. The funds Kossuth collected in the United States were soon absorbed in his revolutionary enterprises, and he made a tour of England and Scotland, delivering lectures. In 1859 his hopes were revived by the preparations of France and Italy for war against Austria, and he entered actively into the plans of his former aversion, Louis Napoleon, with reference to that object. His hopes, however, like those of many others, were dashed by the peace of Villafranca.

When Déak and Andrásy succeeded in bringing about the dual system under which the Austrian and Hungarian crowns are now united, Kossuth exhorted the Hungarians to repudiate it. In 1867 he refused to accept an election as deputy to the Hungarian Diet for Waitzen, being determined never to recognize the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine as the possessor of the Hungarian crown. Subsequently he lost his Hungarian citizenship in consequence of a law denationalizing persons who absented themselves from the country for a period of ten years. To the end he continued to protest against the abandonment by the Hungarians of the cause of national independence. But the outbursts of feeling which took place in Hungary on the occasion of his death, and the remarkable scenes that attended his interment in his native soil, have revealed the depth of his hold on the affections of the people, as well as the permanence of the fascination that enabled him in the days of his power to enlist his countrymen in the cause of independence.

Neither by origin nor by position was Kossuth destined to play a leading part in the affairs of Hungary. He had neither wealth nor rank to aid him, but he embodied, as no one else did, the national impulses of the time, and he expressed them with an eloquence that was irresistible. His weapon was oratory. To military genius he could not lay claim. The conduct of military operations he left to his generals. He could inspire the people to take up arms, but he could not lead them in the field. He influenced the army as citizens, not as soldiers. He led no charges and conducted no cam-

paigns. When only a last desperate hope remained, he resigned his authority into the hands of a military dictator.

As a statesman Kossuth's limitations resulted from his temperament. He was a revolutionist. The qualities that made him the orator that he was, incapacitated him for statesmanship. To say that he would not recognize the truth that

Who does the best his circumstance allows  
Does well, acts nobly,

would, perhaps, be unjust to him. It is probable that he could not grasp it. Under the dual system planned by Déak Hungary substantially secured the full measure of constitutional, legislative and administrative autonomy which Kossuth himself originally sought. But, while his old associate in the Revolution, Andrásy, first as prime minister of Hungary and afterwards as imperial minister for foreign affairs, was not only gaining for Hungary the liberties she desired, but enabling her to wield a paramount influence in imperial councils and thus to affect the destinies of Europe, Kossuth wasted his days in vain regrets not untinged with resentment. It was because of this impracticable temper that the man who, as the incomparable orator of the Hungarian Revolution, fascinated the imagination of the civilized world, came to devote himself to the fantastic pursuit of a delusive project, and, after having signally failed both as an advocate and as a conspirator to accomplish his ends, preferred to die in self-imposed exile.

JOHN BASSETT MOORE.